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abstRact
Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be 
impermissible because we have a right to be treated on the basis of merit and ca-
pacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. i call this suggestion the impermissibility 
account. i argue that, despite how the impermissibility account seems intuitive to 
most of us with a humanist outlook, it is indefensible. i show that well-informed dis-
crimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we 
cannot have a strict right not to be discriminated against. i then propose an alterna-
tive and more plausible account which i call the Fairness and externalities account, 
arguing that acts of discrimination are wrong partly because they are unfair and partly 
because they create harmful externalities which—analogously to pollution—there is 
a collective responsibility to minimize. both of these factors are however defeasible, 
meaning that if the Fairness and externalities account is correct, then discrimina-
tion is sometimes permissible. these results are counterintuitive, and suggest that 
the ethics of discrimination requires further attention.
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1. What is DiscRiMination?
i take discrimination to be to treat someone very differently in an unfavourable 
way based on an irrelevant trait. a trait is relevant if and only if the possession of it 
by itself provides reasons for different treatment in some instance, such as constitut-
ing a difference in merit or capacity. otherwise it is irrelevant. For example, choosing 
members of a sports team based on athletic ability is not an instance of discrimina-
tion, because athletic ability is a relevant trait for being a member of a sports team. 
Doing the same on the basis of ethnicity is however, because ethnicity is not a rel-
evant trait1.
Discrimination caused by bigotry such as racism is often indefensible simply 
because it rests on ungrounded beliefs about the relevance of traits such as ethnicity, 
such as the belief that a given ethnicity is relevantly superior in some normal situa-
tion. Discrimination can be wrong even if it does not suffer from epistemic problems 
however. this is when different treatment is based on an irrelevant trait, but there 
are good epistemic reasons—such as statistical evidence—to believe that holding 
this trait makes it more likely that the same person holds another relevant trait. For 
example, ethnicity is not a relevant trait for performing a normal job. criminality is 
however, and for various reasons (e.g. social segregation along ethnic lines) ethnicity 
can statistically correlate with criminality. in such cases, discriminating on the basis 
of ethnicity constitutes an instance of what i will call ‘epistemically grounded dis-
crimination’, which is what i will focus on in this text.
2. is DiscRiMination iMPeRMissible?
Many of us believe that even epistemically grounded discrimination is some-
times wrong, such as in some cases of ethnic targeting by police. i will now progress to 
consider an account of under what conditions an instance of epistemically grounded 
discrimination is wrong, and what it is that makes it so.
1.  We might use the word ’discrimination’ as simply referring to different treatment based on some 
trait. i will reserve the term for this ‘problematic’ sense, requiring selection based on an irrelevant 
trait. i also believe this definition corresponds closely to how most people use the word.
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those of us with a humanist outlook often have a prima facie intuition that 
discrimination is always wrong in any realistic scenario. here is an account of the 
wrongness of discrimination which corresponds to this intuition: We have the right 
to be judged based on individual merit and capacity rather than generalizations over 
traits for which we are not responsible. specifically, all individuals have a right not to 
be judged or treated differently based on traits which do not constitute a relevant difference 
in merit (e.g. having committed a crime) or capacity (e.g. athletic ability). Furthermore, 
it is impermissible to violate someone’s rights. Discriminating based on e.g. ethnicity 
or gender is to violate someone’s rights in this way. For this reason it is impermissible. 
let us call this the Impermissibility Account.
as mentioned, i believe the impermissibility account is at least prima facie intui-
tive to many of us. this makes it worth studying in more detail. let us test the sugges-
tion by considering the following two examples:
hiring: harold is considering applicants for a position at his company. he 
knows that being a member of an ethnic minority strongly correlates with 
frequency of crime. because of this he chooses not to consider applicants 
belonging to an ethnic minority.
au Pair: cassandra is considering hiring an au pair to take care of her chil-
dren. she knows that being white and male strongly correlates with being 
inept at taking care of children. because of this she chooses not to consider 
white male candidates.
these are both instances of epistemically grounded discrimination, and im-
permissible according to the impermissibility account. in their respective examples 
harold and cassandra both treat some group of individuals very differently based 
on an irrelevant trait (being of an ethnic minority and being a white male respec-
tively). they do however have good reason to believe that these traits correlate with 
a relevant trait (criminality and child-caring respectively), and that therefore—ceteris 
paribus—someone with the irrelevant trait (e.g. being a white male) is more likely to 
possess the relevant trait (e.g. being inept with children) than someone lacking the 
irrelevant trait.
Most of us believe that harold is acting impermissibly, and plausibly for the 
reasons above. he is treating individuals in a way which they have a right not to 
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be treated by discriminating based on ethnicity. Many of us do not however find 
cassandra’s action impermissible, and feel inclined to be more lenient in her case. in 
fact many ads for au pairs specify that they only consider females, and the owners of 
the ad are rarely considered to be doing something impermissible. this would suggest 
that our suggestion is too inclusive, making too many acts of discrimination imper-
missible. in order to still be able to consider harold’s actions impermissible however, 
we need to find some further necessary condition which only rules out hiring.
We might suggest that the relevant difference between hiring and au Pair are 
the objects of discrimination. here is a further condition attempting to accommo-
date this suggestion: Discrimination is only impermissible when the irrelevant trait 
(e.g. being a white male) constitutes the membership of an exposed group. by ‘exposed’ 
i mean a group which is generally considered to be at the receiving end of structural 
oppression, such as ethnic minorities or women2. cassandra’s discrimination is di-
rected at white males, which are not an exposed group, while as harold’s actions are 
directed at an ethnic minority, which is an exposed group. therefore harold’s dis-
crimination is impermissible, but not cassandra’s.
adding this condition to the impermissibility account captures a further intu-
ition, but the condition is both problematically vague and insufficient. it is problem-
atically vague because there are cases in which it is not clear whether a trait should 
warrant membership in an exposed group or not (e.g. having one grandparent of an 
ethnic minority). i will not elaborate on this issue. More relevantly it is insufficient 
because sometimes it seems permissible, and even morally required, to discriminate 
even when the object of discrimination is a member of an exposed group. consider 
the following example:
alley: in order to get to the other side of town one needs to pass through 
either alley a or alley b. a tourist, who is internationally famous for spread-
ing money around everywhere he goes, needs to get to the other side of 
town, and asks Pasha how to get there. Pasha knows only the following: 
(a) Passing through a is slightly quicker than b, (b) a is mainly populated 
with members of an ethnic minority and b by non-minorities and (c) being 
a member of the ethnic minority statistically correlates strongly with high 
2.  What it means to be at the receiving end of structural oppression is a complicated question. 
since this is not an account i intend to defend here i will simply assume whatever interpretation of it 
that is the most charitable.
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frequency of violent crime, while there is no such correlation for non-mi-
norities. the tourist will only understand a simple direction to a or b, and 
will then trust Pasha’s recommendation blindly.
in this case it seems to me that Pasha is not only permitted to direct the tourist to 
b despite a being the quicker path, but is also morally required to do so. the tourist 
is left at Pasha’s mercy, and directing him to a would likely put him at great risk. 
Doing so would however imply discriminating against the individuals in a which are 
members of an exposed group, because Pasha would treat them very differently by 
recommending the tourist to avoid them only on the basis of their ethnicity, thereby 
robbing them of the chance to receive some of his significant spending3. if this is 
correct, it cannot be impermissible or even always morally wrong to discriminate 
on the basis of irrelevant traits which constitute membership of an exposed group. 
this implies that the impermissibility account cannot be correct, and that we should 
reject it as an account of the conditions under which epistemically grounded dis-
crimination is wrong. it follows that discrimination based on e.g. ethnicity is some-
times permissible.
3. FaiRness anD exteRnalities
We might find it surprising that we cannot defend the impermissibility account. 
this does not mean however that epistemically grounded discrimination is always, 
or even often, permissible; most often it is not. to determine when this is the case 
we need an alternative—defensible—account of under what conditions an instance 
of epistemically grounded discrimination is wrong, and preferably of what it is that 
makes it so. Furthermore we would like such an account to capture variations in the 
wrongness of discrimination depending on the objects of discrimination.
i suggest that the best account of the wrongness of discrimination, and the one 
that we should prefer over the impermissibility account, is what i will call the Fairness 
and Externalities Account. this account states that the wrongness of discrimination is 
constituted by two independent and defeasible factors:
3.  notice that this example is structurally similar to hiring, in that both harold and Pasha avoid 
treating some individuals based on an irrelevant trait. For this reason we should not object only to 
alley as an example on the basis that Pasha does not ‘treat’ the inhabitants of alley a, because on 
that notion harold does not ‘treat’ his applicants either.
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Fairness: Discriminating against an individual is unfair to that individual, 
and all else equal it is wrong to treat an individual unfairly.
Harmful Externalities: Discriminating against an individual produces harmful 
externalities for individuals sharing the trait which has been the grounds for 
discrimination.
Fairness is something like being treated in proportion to one’s desert, need and 
capacity4. When someone is not selected for a job because of their ethnicity, this is 
unfair to them, because they have ceteris paribus equal desert, need and capacity to 
perform the job to other applicants. For this reason both harold and cassandra are 
treating their respective applicants unfairly. to be treated fairly is however not an un-
alienable right, and sometimes we are permitted to treat people unfairly when it is re-
quired for overriding reasons. an example of this is might be collective punishment 
of a platoon for the mistake of an individual, when it is required for discipline. When 
there are no such overriding considerations it is wrong to treat individuals unfairly.
i believe the fairness condition captures something intuitive about the wrong-
ness of discrimination, in that we all feel—no matter our background—like we are 
treated unfairly when someone behaves differently to us in an unfavourable way due 
to some irrelevant trait of ours. i also believe that it is plausible to say that it is ceteris 
paribus wrong—when nothing sufficiently important is at stake—to treat someone 
unfairly in such a way. this condition seems sufficient to explain why all instances 
of discrimination seem at least somewhat wrong, including e.g. cassandra’s. it does 
not however explain why we intuitively believe that it is much worse to discriminate 
against some individuals and groups than others, e.g. why harold’s act of discrimina-
tion seems much worse than cassandra’s. to do this we need to consider the second 
condition.
acts of discrimination can be harmful, e.g. if one of harold’s applicants is very 
poor and in need of a job. one might suggest that the harm caused to the objects 
of discrimination is larger in hiring than in au Pair, and that this is what makes 
harold’s actions worse than cassandra’s. however, variation in the harm caused to 
the individual being discriminated against is insufficient to account for the variation 
4.  because fairness is a complicated and contested concept i believe it is wiser not to attempt to 
give a precise definition in this essay, at the risk of diverging from the main discussion. instead i rely 
on the assumption that the reader sufficiently shares my intuitive conception of fairness.
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of wrongness that we find depending on the object of discrimination. For example, 
it might be that some of harold’s applicants are very well-off and not significantly 
harmed by being discriminated against. Rather there seems to be something relevant-
ly wrong about the discrimination being based on ethnicity, independently of the 
harm caused to the discriminated individual.
i argue that this can be explained in terms of harmful externalities. an external-
ity is ‘a cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit’5, 
which includes but is not limited to the harm caused to the object of discrimina-
tion. When someone is discriminated against on the basis of a specific trait, this can 
produce harmful externalities not only for them but also for others sharing that trait, 
e.g. by reducing opportunities, perpetuating stereotypes or solidifying segregation 
along ethnic lines. For example, when harold systematically disregards an exposed 
group he is signalling to other employers that this group is not to be trusted, making 
them less likely to hire members of the ethnic minority. this causes a higher level of 
unemployment among the ethnic minority and perpetuates alienation, which consti-
tutes a harm to members of that group. in other words, the harm act of discrimination 
can extend beyond the target of discrimination to others who share her traits.
i believe this can account for cases like hiring and au Pair. For example, i would 
argue that the harm caused to white males by cassandra by e.g. limiting the group’s 
chances to improve its child-caring skills is non-negligible, but comparatively limited. 
harold on the other hand might more plausibly be contributing to a deep societal 
problem of segregation along ethnic lines, which is much more problematic. this 
condition can account for why harold’s actions are wrong while cassandra’s are 
plausibly permissible, because discriminating against an ethnic minority produces 
more harmful externalities than discriminating against white males.
i believe the Fairness and externalities account captures the wrongness of dis-
crimination in an intuitive way by both capturing why we think that there is always 
something wrong about discrimination, but also why the wrongness can vary with 
the object of discrimination. accepting the account would however have some coun-
terintuitive consequences:
Firstly, the nature of externalities is often such that they affect large groups and 
are produced collectively by many individuals, as is the case when it comes to pollu-
tion. the responsibility not to produce such externalities is collective, and any in-
dividual responsibility is a part of that collective responsibility. this means that ac-
5.  buchanan & stubblebine (1962)
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cording to the Fairness and externalities account the wrongness of discrimination is 
largely made up of a failure to live up to one’s part in the collective responsibility not 
to e.g. perpetuate alienating stereotypes. specifically, any further wrongness to dis-
criminating against an exposed group relative to e.g. white males is fully constituted 
by one’s marginal contribution to negative externalities for that group. this is coun-
terintuitive, because discrimination is intuitively thought of wronging someone, not 
as—like driving a car with unnecessarily high emissions—contributing to the pro-
duction of negative effects for a group.
secondly, like with pollution there can sometimes be overriding reasons to dis-
regard this collective responsibility when the marginal harm produced is significantly 
outweighed by the harm of alternative actions. this is what happens in alley, where 
the risk to the tourist outweighs the unfairness and harm caused to the individuals in 
alley a. because both Fairness and harmful externalities are defeasible, discrimina-
tion is permissible when the unfairness and negative externalities are counterweighed 
by independent considerations. in cassandra’s case this seems quite intuitive a well: 
if the probability of a white male applicant being good with children is significantly 
lower than other candidates, this might plausibly outweigh the unfairness and harm 
caused to the white male applicants. on the other hand however, it seems then that 
harold might also be allowed to discriminate based on ethnicity if, for example, his 
business was extremely sensitive to criminality and the correlation between ethnicity 
and criminality sufficiently strong, which appears counterintuitive.
4. conclusion
i have argued that unalienable rights are not sufficient to explain the wrongness 
of discrimination by showing why the impermissibility account is implausible, and 
that it should instead be explained by unfairness and negative externalities in accor-
dance with the Fairness and externalities account. if this is correct then this means 
that we should shift our view of the wrongness of discrimination to it as largely 
being a failure of a collective responsibility, and that we have to consider for each 
case whether there are sufficient independent considerations to make discrimination 
permissible. For example, how sensitive does harold’s business need to be to allow 
him to discriminate? i believe this is counterintuitive, and indicates that the ethics 
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of discrimination is more complicated than it might first appear and deserves further 
attention6.
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